"Leader Preferences and Government Spending in Democracies and Dictatorships."
How do actors' preferences and domestic political institutions influence government spending when leaders and their constituents can differ in their policy preferences? A formal model developed to address this question indicates variation in winning coalitions' spending preferences and the cost of leader replacement results in leaders securing their survival with different spending distributions and varying in their responsiveness to their constituents' preferences. Consistent with the model's expectations, I find that, compared to democratic leaders, dictators spend more on the military and their preferences have a larger effect on military spending.
How do actors' preferences and domestic political institutions influence government spending when leaders and their constituents can differ in their policy preferences? A formal model developed to address this question indicates variation in winning coalitions' spending preferences and the cost of leader replacement results in leaders securing their survival with different spending distributions and varying in their responsiveness to their constituents' preferences. Consistent with the model's expectations, I find that, compared to democratic leaders, dictators spend more on the military and their preferences have a larger effect on military spending.
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