Leaders, Interstate Conflict, and Spatial Interdependence*

Jeff Carter
Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi
jcarter3@olemiss.edu

March 31, 2018

Word Count: 8,799

Abstract

I argue that spatial interdependence exists in the relative hawkishness and dovishness of the political leaders we observe. Hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are dovish leaders and, therefore represent a security threat to nearby states. At the same time, individuals prefer hawkish politicians and more aggressive policies when they feel threatened by an external actor. Taken together, these observations suggest hawkish leaders should diffuse and cluster across space and over time. I assess this claim using a spatial regression model on a sample of 137 countries during the period between 1960 and 1999. Consistent with expectations, I find that having a relatively hawkish leader or a relatively dovish leader results in geographically proximate states having relatively more hawkish leaders or dovish leaders. My results suggest that the diffusion and clustering of interstate conflicts in time and space likely are driven by the diffusion and clustering of hawkish and dovish leaders.

*A previous version of this project was presented at the 2017 meetings of the Peace Science Society (International).

1 Introduction

While explanations of conflict and cooperation traditionally focused on the role of the international system and states, over the last twenty years something approaching a consensus has emerged among scholars from multiple research traditions that political leaders play a central role in determining patterns of foreign policy and interstate conflict. National executives have been linked to systematic variation in the initiation, escalation, prosecution, termination, and outcomes of interstate conflicts (among others, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Croco 2011, Weeks 2014). Going beyond the basic claim that leaders matter, scholars have demonstrated that leaders' personal attributes, background experiences, political orientations, and/or psychological traits influence, among other things, conflict initiation (Colgan 2013, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015, Heffington 2018), intervention in ongoing wars (Kertzer 2016), the pursuit of nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2014), and the outcome of interstate conflicts (Ausderan 2015). Thus, there is strong evidence that leaders in general and leaders possessing specific characteristics and traits in particular influence world politics in important ways.

At the same time, scholars across the discipline increasingly appreciate how geography and space more generally shape politics. This idea is perhaps most well developed in the literature on policy diffusion in American politics (for example, Shipan and Volden 2008, Karch 2007). In comparative and international political economy, there is strong evidence that trade and tax policies and financial fragility diffuse and cluster in space and networks (Franzese and Hays 2008, Chaudoin, Milner and Pang 2015, Bauerle Danzman, Winecoff and Oatley 2017). Civil conflict appears to cluster geographically, often in poor regions populated with non-democracies, and diffuse across international borders (Gleditsch 2007, Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, Maves and Braithwaite 2013). The idea that interstate conflicts and wars cluster and diffuse is not new (Siverson and Starr 1990), and has been confirmed by recent research using more advanced statistical methods (Braithwaite 2005, Braithwaite 2006).

I argue that, like government policies, economic liberalization, civil conflicts, and interstate conflicts, political leaders diffuse and cluster in space and time. I am not the first to suggest

that hawks and doves are not equally distributed around the world. In their important book *Why Leaders Fight*, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015, Chapter 3) note that there is considerable regional variation in the relative "riskiness " of the leaders we observe. Horowitz, Stam and Ellis focus on the implications of this regional clustering but leave unexamined an important question: why would relatively hawkish and dovish leaders cluster in time and space?

I argue hawks and doves diffuse and, consequently, cluster due a set of mutually reinforcing relationships among leaders, interstate conflict, and how external threats influence citizens' preferences for hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawkish leaders are more likely to involve their countries in interstate conflicts than are dovish leaders (e.g., Heffington 2018). Hawkish leaders then represent a threat to the national security of nearby countries in a way that dovish leaders do not. During times of threat by an external actor, individuals are more supportive of hawkish politicians and aggressive policies that they believe will make them safer (among others, Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2009, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, Albertson and Gadarian 2015). It follows that domestic populations will prefer relatively hawkish leaders over relatively dovish leaders when nearby states have relatively hawkish leaders. I test the implications of this claim on the universe of states in the international system between 1960 and 1999 using a multi-parameter spatio-temporal autoregressive (m-STAR) model (Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010). Consistent with expectations, I find that hawkish and dovish leaders diffuse across space over time. As hawkish leaders and dovish leaders systematically differ in the probability they initiate interstate conflicts, my results suggest that patterns of conflict and cooperation across time and space are at least partially driven by the diffusion and clustering of hawks and doves.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of research on the relationship between leaders' latent hawkishness and interstate conflict. I then present my argument for why relatively hawkish leaders and relatively dovish leaders should diffuse and cluster together in time and space. The third section describes my research design while the fourth presents my statistical results. The paper concludes with a brief summary and a discussion of some of the larger implications of my findings.

2 Hawks, Doves, and Interstate Conflict

One of the least controversial findings in the literature on domestic politics and interstate conflict is that hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate conflicts than are dovish leaders. While specific explanations of this relationship vary, the basic theoretical argument is straightforward: hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are dovish leaders because decision-makers' valuations of possible outcomes influence their choices and hawks pay a lower subjective cost for participating in a military conflict than do doves (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, Schultz 2005, Wolford 2007).

Three strands of scholarship provide empirical support for the claim that hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are doves (Carter and Chiozza 2018). The first approach links differences in leaders' personal attributes and background experiences to patterns of interstate conflict. For example, leaders who served in the military prior to assuming power are more likely to initiate conflicts than are leaders with civilian backgrounds (Horowitz and Stam 2014, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015, Carter and Nordstrom 2017). While combat experience mitigates this relationship (Horowitz and Stam 2014, Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015), military training and experience socializes individuals to see using force as a more viable and less costly policy option than most civilians (Huntington 1957, Bachman, Blair and Segal 1977, Sechser 2004).[1]Leaders who rebelled against their governments (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015) and those that led revolutions (Colgan 2013, Colgan and Weeks 2015) before obtaining office also are more likely to initiate conflicts than leaders without those experiences. The logic underlying these relationships is that individuals who rebel against the government and lead revolutions tend to be relatively risk-acceptant and more aggressive than other individuals. Thus, leaders whose personal attributes and background experiences are associated with hawkish preferences are more likely to initiate conflicts than other leaders.

A second line of scholarship concludes that leaders with hawkish political orientations are more likely to start interstate conflicts than are leaders with dovish orientations. Much of this research

[1]Note that there is also evidence that more hawkish individuals are more likely to select into military service as well (Bachman et al. 2000).

links democratic leaders' general orientations towards the use of military force to their political ideology and/or partisanship based on the observation that political parties on the right are more hawkish, on average, than political parties on the left (Budge et al. 2001, Schultz 2001). Consistent with this, democratic governments led by right parties are more likely to initiate conflicts and fight longer conflics than those led by parties on the left (Palmer, London and Regan 2004, Arena and Palmer 2009, Clare 2010, Koch and Sullivan 2010). Taking a slightly different approach, Heffington (2018) finds that leaders of parties whose platforms more explicitly advocate for international peace in general or with respect to specific countries and advocate for less military engagement abroad are less likely to initiate interstate conflicts. Thus, there is evidence that democratic leaders from more hawkish, right-wing parties are more likely to start conflicts than are democratic leaders from more dovish, left-wing parties.

A third approach, typically associated with the foreign policy analysis tradition (Hudson 2005, Houghton 2017, Schafer and Smith 2017), argues that variation in psychological traits and dispositions makes some leaders more hawkish and likely to initiate conflicts than other leaders. Analyses of leaders' psychological traits and their implications for interstate conflict are closely associated with the work of Margaret Hermann. Hermann argues leaders differ along a number of dimensions (e.g., nationalism, cognitive complexity, and need for power) that shape variation in their underlying willingness to challenge political constraints, openness to new information, and motivation for pursuing policies (among others, Hermann 1980, Kaarbo and Hermann 1998, Hermann et al. 2001). Empirically, individuals who are more willing to challenge political constraints, have lower levels of cognitive complexity, or have higher levels of distrust, are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies (Kowert and Hermann 1997, Keller 2005, Keller and Foster 2012, Foster and Keller 2014). A related strand of research focuses on political leaders' operational codes. (George 1969, Walker 1983, Renshon 2008). Scholars argue that a leader's operational code influences her decisions and her state's foreign policies. For example, leaders who believe the world is fundamentally one of competition and goals are best pursued with aggression are more likely to engage in conflictual behavior (Schafer and Walker 2006).

The preceding discussion makes clear that research from multiple traditions concludes that

leaders who possess more hawkish traits in terms of personal experiences, political orientations, and/or psychological attributes and dispositions are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are leaders with dovish characteristics. If a hawkish leader is more likely to involve his or her country in an interstate conflict, why, then would domestic populations want a hawkish leader of their own in response to the presence of a hawkish leader in a nearby country? Framed differently, why should hawks diffuse? The next section provides an answer to this question.

3 Why Hawks Should Flock Together

Hawkish and dovish leaders should diffuse and, therefore, cluster in time and space because of 1) the respective threats they represent to other countries' security and 2) how the security environment influences individuals' preferences for hawkish and dovish leaders. It is useful at this point to be clear about the concepts of diffusion and clustering and how they are related to one another. Clustering exists when a trait or policy is more likely to be observed among units that are close to one another than in units that are distant from one another (Elkins and Simmons 2005, Franzese and Hays 2008). Clustering can arise through two data generating processes that are conceptually distinct but difficult to empirically distinguish between. First, clustering can occur due to common shocks, or "correlated responses to correlated unit-level, contextual, or context-conditional factors" (Franzese and Hays 2008, 752). Second, clustering can occur due to diffusion, or when the " prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters" (Strang 1991, 325). Elkins and Simmons (2005, 39) identify two broad classes of diffusion mechanisms: adaptation and learning. Within these broad cateogires, scholars often distinguish between diffusion through coercion, competition, learning, emulation, or migration (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, Franzese and Hays 2008, Thies, Chyzh and Nieman 2016). Hawkish and dovish leaders are likely to diffuse through adaptation/competition and learning.

Diffusion via adaptation occurs when the decision(s) of one actor alters the value or payoffs associated with the policies of other actors (Elkins and Simmons 2005, Thies, Chyzh and Nieman 2016). Both rational deterrence theory and the bargaining model of conflict suggest that interacting

with hawks and doves influences the payoffs an actor receives during crisis bargaining. A simple immediate deterrence game holds that, all else equal, a challenger is more likely to choose the status quo and less likely to attack a target as the target's expected utility for war increases (Achen and Snidal 1989, Huth 1999). As hawks pay lower subjective costs for fighting a war than do doves, a hawkish leader's expected utility for war is higher than a dovish leader's expected utility for war. Accordingly, the logic of immediate deterrence implies that states should be less likely to challenge hawkish leaders than dovish leaders and that, if war occurs, a hawkish leader will obtain a better payoff than a dovish leader. In terms of the bargaining approach to conflict, the value of an actor's outside option (war) increases as the costs of fighting decrease (Fearon 1995, Muthoo 1999). This allows hawkish challengers to credibly demand more than dovish challengers and, because they are less willing to cede territory in crisis bargaining, results in hawkish targets being more successful at deterring challengers than dovish targets (Carter 2018). Thus, domestic populations can expect different payoffs in times of crisis bargaining depending on whether they have a relatively hawkish or dovish leader.

Diffusion due to learning occurs when a change in an actor's behavior imparts information about the environment (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, Franzese and Hays 2008). Whether the domestic population of one country chooses a relatively hawkish or dovish leader could signal their intentions to the domestic populations of nearby states. There is a long standing idea among IR scholars that domestic populations prefer tough, hawkish leaders when they are involved in a crisis or preparing for war (Vasquez 1993, Huth 1996, Senese and Vasquez 2005). If this is the case, then the presence of a hawkish leader or multiple hawkish leaders in a geographic area could signal hostile intentions or a dangerous security environment to the domestic populations other other states in the area. Alternatively, the presence of a dovish leader or multiple dovish leaders in an area could signal that states want to cooperate and there are minimal threats to international security in the region. Importantly, either of these scenarios could provide information about the security environment that could induce the diffusion and clustering of hawkish or dovish leaders.

Research on individuals' responses to external threats provides microfoundations for why hawks or doves should diffuse and cluster in space and time. As hawkish leaders are more likely to start

interstate conflicts than are dovish leaders, hawks represent a threat to the national security of nearby states that doves do not. At a very general level, "threats and the anxieties that accompany those threats lead to a public ... more supportive of public policies they believe will return security" (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 4-5). In the context of national security, politicians and parties associated with hawkish policy positions typically are viewed as better able to protect citizens from external threats and, therefore, tend to garner greater political support than their dovish counterparts when the public feels threatened.[2] In a series of papers, Huddy, Feldman, and co-authors find that higher levels of perceived threat were associated with greater support for more aggressive national security policies and military action among the U.S. public in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks (Huddy et al. 2005, Huddy, Feldman and Weber 2007, Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2009). These relationships also hold outside of the 9/11 context. Higher levels of perceived threat increase support for aggressive military policies (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and reduce support for politicians with less aggressive traits, especially when they are from the party perceived as weaker on national security issues (Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister 2011). Gadarian (2010*a*, 2010*b*) demonstrates that higher levels of threat are associated with individuals adopting more hawkish foreign policy preferences and an increased probability of voting for politicians who espouse hawkish foreign policy positions. Relatedly, Albertson and Gadarian (2015, pgs. 117-124) find that higher levels of anxiety (which is a function of how threatened an individual feels) is associated with greater support for using military force instead of diplomacy, higher defense spending, stronger homeland security policies, and the Iraq war. Drawing on data from the World Values Survey that covers seventy countries, Miller (2017) finds that, on average, citizens favor stronger, less constrained political executives during periods of territorial threat. Focusing on election outcomes, political candidates from relatively hawkish Israeli parties receive a higher vote-share in areas that suffer from terrorist attacks in general (Berrebi and Klor 2008) and rocket attacks in particular (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014).

The preceding discussion suggests that we should observe spatial interdependence in hawkish

[2]This claim can be viewed as an implication of the concept of "issue ownership," where individuals are more likely to support politicians who are viewed as better able to handle salient issues (Petrocik 1996). Although, recent research suggests citizens support for parties and politicians is driven more by how the parties represent citizens' relevant social identities than their issue positions (e.g., Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2004, Ondercin 2017).

leaders and dovish leaders. Both types of leaders influence bargaining dynamics and provide information about the security environment in a region. Further, because hawks are systematically more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are doves, hawkish leaders represent a greater threat to nearby states. This should result in the diffusion of hawkish and dovish leaders because individuals have a relative preference for hawkish leaders, parties, and policies when they feel threatened by an external actor (Gadarian 2010*a*, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, Albertson and Gadarian 2015). The next section describes how I empirically assess this claim.

4 Research Design

My claim that hawkish and dovish leaders should diffuse and cluster is assessed among 137 states in the international system between 1960 and 1999.[3] The base data set is taken from the replication materials associated with Thies, Chyzh and Nieman (2016).[4]

4.1 Estimator

I use an m-STAR (multi-parameter spatio-temporal autoregressive) model (Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010) to assess whether hawkish and dovish leaders diffuse across space over time. The m-STAR model explicitly accounts for spatial and temporal dependence among observations and allows unit-level variables to influence the dependent variable in a given state and all other states in the international system over time. More formally, the m-STAR estimator is defined as follows:

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{W}\mathbf{y} + \phi\mathbf{V}\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{X}\beta + \epsilon, \text{where} \tag{1}$$

$$\mathbf{W} = \sum_{r=1}^{R} \rho_r \mathbf{W}_r, \tag{2}$$

[3]All data and code needed to replicate the analyses associated with this project will be made publicly available upon publication.

[4]Replication materials available at `https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/VPTTOB`.

where $\mathbf{y}$ is a vector of the dependent variable, ρ_r the coefficients associated with the spatial lags, $\mathbf{W}_r$ the NTxNT matrices whose elements identify the weighted relationship between states i and j, ϕ the coefficient on the first-order temporal lag $\mathbf{Vy}$, $\mathbf{V}$ the NTxNT matrix with 1's on the minor diagonal and 0's elsewhere, $\mathbf{X}$ the NT matrix of k exogenous state-level variables, β the vector of coefficients, and ϵ is a vector of randomly distributed errors (Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010, Thies, Chyzh and Nieman 2016).

The spatial and temporal lags on the right-hand side of the m-STAR model produce two substantively important features that allow me to assess interdependence in patterns of leader hawkishness. First, the value of the dependent variable in one cross-sectional unit can affect the values of all other cross-sectional units. Second, the values of unit-level variables in one cross-sectional unit can influence the values of the dependent variable in every cross-sectional unit over time. These characteristics of the m-STAR model exist because state-level variables have a direct, contemporaneous effect on a state's dependent variable in a given year through $\mathbf{X}\beta$ in Equation 1 and the value of a state's dependent variable in a given year influences the values of the dependent variables in other states through the spatial connectivity matrices (see $\mathbf{Wy}$ in Equation 1 and the definition of $\mathbf{W}$ in Equation 2). Further, the temporal lag of the dependent variable and the spatial connectivity matrices combine to create a feedback loop in which past values of the dependent variable in a given state, which also are a function of past values of the state-level variables, indirectly influence the contemporaneous values of the dependent variable in a given state through its influence on the past values of the dependent variables for other states. This implies, for example, the hawkishness of France's leader in year t is a function of the values of its state-level covariates in year t, the hawkishness of France's leader in year $t-1$, and the hawkishness of Germany's leader in year t, which is a function of the values of Germany's state-level covariates in year t, the hawkishness of Germany's leader in year $t-1$ and the hawkishness of France's leader in year $t-1$, and so on.

4.2 Dependent Variable

My dependent variable, *Leader Hawkishness*, measures leaders' willingness to use military force. Empirically identifying leaders' underlying hawkishness is notoriously difficult. As discussed above,

scholars typically take one of three approaches. The first approach is to measure leaders' willingness to use force as a function of their objective attributes and background experiences (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015, Carter and Nordstrom 2017).[5] This strategy is based on the idea that an individual's worldview, attitudes, and preferences are shaped by his or her life experiences. The second is to use a measure of a leader's government's left-right orientation (Palmer, London and Regan 2004, Arena and Palmer 2009, Clare 2010). The logic behind this approach is that parties on the right generally hold more hawkish foreign policy preferences than parties on the left (Schultz 2001, Palmer, London and Regan 2004). The third commonly used strategy is to construct measures of a leader's personality or operational code (Renshon 2008, Keller and Foster 2012). Unfortunately, measures of government orientation and leaders' personality traits and operational code have limited temporal and spatial domains and are rarely available for non-democratic countries.

Setting aside the availability of data on general orientations, psychological characteristics or personal attributes for the moment, arguably the principle difficulty of measuring a leader's underlying willingness to use force is that it is not directly observable. Motivated by this insight, the measure of leaders' hawkishness used here was developed using latent variable modeling techniques by Carter and Smith (2018).[6] Latent variable models are used increasingly in political science to measure concepts that are not directly observable; including but certainly not limited to legislators' ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1991, Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004), judges' ideology (Martin and Quinn 2002), regime type (Treier and Jackman 2008, Pemstein, Meserve and Melton 2010), states' preferences over the international status quo (Reed et al. 2008), and standards of human rights accountability (Fariss 2014). Carter and Smith (2018) use a hierarchical Rasch model implemented with Bayesian methods in Stan (Carpenter et al. 2016) to estimate leaders' latent willingness to use military force based on data from leaders' personal attributes and background experiences, political orientations, and/or psychological traits. Data on leaders' personal attributes and background experiences are drawn from the LEAD project (Ellis, Horowitz and Stam 2015). The LEAD project contains data on a range of personal attributes and experiences

[5]Note that this is a natural extension of research that links individual leader attributes to the probability his or her country initiates an interstate conflict (Colgan 2013, Horowitz and Stam 2014).

[6]The variable *Leader Hawkishness* used in the analyses for this paper is taken from the measure that best predicted MID initiation in Carter and Smith's (2018) validation analyses (θ_1).

for 2,965 national political executives between 1875 and 2004. These variables cover leaders' military service, involvement in a rebel movement, sex, family life, occupations, and other experiences. Information about leaders' general political orientations towards the use of military force from two data sets. The first, Seki and Williams's (2014) Annual Government Partisanship data set, includes measures of a leader's general political orientation (*Right-Left*), support for peaceful international relations in general or with respect to specific countries (*International Peace*), and net support for military engagement with other countries (*Hawk*) based on data from the Manifesto Data Project (Volkens et al. 2013, version 16a). The Seki and Williams data includes information on 398 political executives from 37 democracies between 1944 and 2014. The second source of information about leaders' political orientations is the Heads of Government (HoG) data set (Brambor, Lindvall and Stjernquist 2017). The HoG data identify the ideological orientations (left/right/center) of 1,199 political executives from 33 countries, including some non-democracies, between 1870 and 2012. Finally, information about leaders' psychological willingness to challenge constraints is drawn from Keller (2005). Keller's data is derived from Hermann's (2005) leadership trait data and covers 42 national leaders between 1937 and 1998. This measure, and the underlying data from Hermann, are based on an analysis of at least 50 speeches by each national political executive. Speeches were coded for what they revealed about leaders' underlying "need for power," "task emphasis," "distrust of others," and "nationalism." Keller standardized and combined leaders' scores on these four indicators to create a single index that represents leaders' "willingness to challenge potential pacifying constraints in the pursuit of aggressive foreign policy behavior" (Keller 2005, pg. 211-212). My dependent variable *Leader Hawkishness* is a state-year version of the leader-level variable created by Carter and Smith (2018).

4.3 Spatial and Temporal Lags

Spatial interdependence in the hawkishness of the leaders we observe is captured in the m-STAR model through the spatial connectivity matrices $\mathbf{W}_r$. I include two spatial lags in the model estimated here. The first measures the logged distance between states i and j. This variable captures the idea that the relative hawkishness of a state's leader is influenced more by the relative

hawkishness of the leaders of states geographically close. The second spatial lag identifies whether states i and j have fought a MID against one another in the past five years (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). This variable captures the idea that domestic populations care more about the relative hawkishness of the leaders of states' that their country has recently fought in an interstate conflict than states their country has not recently fought.

4.4 State-Level Variables

My statistical model estimates *Leader Hawkishness* as a function of several state-level variables. The first proxies the security environment of a state as a function of a series of structural variables independent of its leader's latent hawkishness and the hawkishness of the leaders of countries near it (Carter 2018). In particular, *Pr(Target)* identifies that probability a state will be targeted in an interstate dispute as a function of whether it is involved in a strategic interstate *Rivalry* (Thompson and Dreyer 2011) or an ongoing *Territorial Dispute* (Hensel 2001, Territorial Claims Data, version 1.01), its *Number of Borders* (Debs and Goemans 2010), its *Capabilities* (modeled by its CINC score (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972)), its level of *Democracy* (identified with the polity2 index (Marshall and Jaggers 2005)), whether it is involved in a *Civil War* (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and the cubic polynomial of the number of years since the last time it was targeted (Carter and Signorino 2010).[7] The variables *Interstate War* and *Civil War*, respectively drawn from Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), account for a state's participation in an interstate or civil war in a given year. *Democracy* (Marshall and Jaggers 2005), *Number of Borders* (Debs and Goemans 2010), and *Capabilities* (Correlates of War 2001) are coded as described above. Given that *Democracy*, *Number of Borders*, and *Capabilities* are included in the specification directly as state-level predictors and indirectly through *Pr(Target)*, the coefficients associated with *Democracy*, *Number of Borders*, and *Capabilities* should be interpreted as the effect of these variables on *Leader Hawkishness* beyond how they might affect the dependent variable indirectly through their influence on the probability a state is targeted. A state's *Economic Growth* and *Economic Development*

[7] Following Carter and Signorino's (2010) advice, I divided the number of peace years by ten to help aid the numeric stability of the estimates.

(GDP per capita) (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012) also are included as state-level variables. Finally, the model estimates *Leader Hawkishness* as a function of a linear time trend to capture secular patterns, a set of regional dummy variables (with Europe as the excluded category), and a set of country-fixed effects.

5 Results

Table 1 reports the parameter estimates associated with the m-STAR model. The results for the temporal lag and spatial lags are presented in the top portion of the table. As one might expect, the temporal lag of the dependent variable is positive and statistically significant; that is, the hawkishness of a state's leader in year t is a function of the hawkishness of its leader in year $t-1$. Consistent with expectations, the spatial lag associated with the (logged) distance between two countries is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that the hawkishness of a leader in a given state is influenced more by the relative hawkishness of leaders in geographically proximate states than the relative hawkishness of leaders in geographically distant states. The spatial lag that identifies whether two countries have fought against each other in a recent MID is positive but insignificant.

Taken together, the statistically significant estimates on the temporal lag of the dependent variable and the spatial lag associated with the geographic distance between two states indicate the existence of a feedback loop between the relative hawkishness of the leaders of geographically proximate countries. This is because the hawkishness of state i's leader in year t is a function of 1) the hawkishness of its leader in year $t-1$ and 2) the hawkishness of state j's leader in year t. Accordingly, the hawkishness of state j's leader in year t will directly influence the hawkishness of state i's leader in year t through the spatial lag and indirectly influence the hawkishness of state i's leader through the temporal lag in years $t+1$, $t+2$, etc. Thus, the top portion of Table 1 is consistent with my claim that hawkish and dovish leaders should diffuse and cluster in space and time.

The bottom half of Table 1 reports the short-term effects of a set of state-level variables on

Leader Hawkishness. States tend to have more dovish leaders when the probability they will be targeted in an interstate dispute is high once you take into consideration spatial interdependence in patterns of hawks and doves. All else equal, democracies, more economically developed countries, and states in the Middle East tend to have more dovish leaders. Additionally, states with more borders generally have more dovish leaders after you take into account the relationship between a state's number of borders and the probability it is targeted in an interstate dispute. In contrast, states involved in a civil war tend to have more hawkish leaders. Additionally, it appears that there has been a small but significant secular increase in the average hawkishness of the leaders we observe.

A key feature of the m-STAR estimator is its ability to identify how unit-level factors influence the larger system (Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010, Thies, Chyzh and Nieman 2016). In the case at hand, this means that we can identify how changing the values of a state-level factor in a given country influences the relative hawkishness of the leaders it has over time and the hawkishness of the other leaders we observe in the international system. I conducted two sets of post-estimation simulations to demonstrate how hawkish leaders and dovish leaders can diffuse across the international system over time.[8]

[8]The following simulations were conducted by modifying the replication code associated with Thies, Chyzh and Nieman (2016).

Table 1: Multi-parametric Spatio-Temporal Autoregression on Leader Hawkishness, 1960-1999.

Spatial or Temporal Lags	β/(s.e.)
Leader Hawkishness$_{t-1}$	0.844***
	(0.007)
Distance Spatial Lag	-0.122**
	(0.056)
Recent MID Spatial Lag	0.006
	(0.008)
Unit Level Variables	
Pr(Target)	-0.567**
	(0.250)
Interstate War	0.006
	(0.022)
Civil War	0.036*
	(0.020)
Democracy	-0.018***
	(0.001)
Neighbors	-0.011**
	(0.005)
Capabilities	0.954
	(1.138)
Economic Development	-0.075***
	(0.017)
Economic Growth	-0.030
	(0.073)
Time Trend	0.001**
	(0.001)
Americas	-0.082
	(0.057)
Africa	-0.062
	(0.093)
Middle East	-0.816***
	(0.176)
Asia	-0.244
	(0.173)
Constant	-1.782
	(1.093)
σ	0.236***
	(0.003)
Log-Likelihood	100.459
Observations	4098

Two-tailed: $*$: p $\leq$ 0.05; $**$: p $\leq$ 0.01.; $***$: p $\leq$ 0.001.

Coefficients for fixed country effects not reported for space purposes.

The first set of simulations estimated the expected change in *Leader Hawkishness* in states throughout the world over a four-year period (mean duration of leader tenure) given a one-standard deviation reduction in China's level of *Economic Development*.[9] Figure 1 reports the results of this simulation, with darker shades of red representing increasingly hawkish leaders. Per Table 1, there is a negative relationship between *Economic Development* and *Leader Hawkishness*. Accordingly, the simulations indicate that reducing China's GDP per capita by one-standard deviation is associated with China having a more hawkish leader. Importantly, though, reducing China's level of development also influences the relative hawkishness of the leaders we observe in countries throughout the international system. Naturally, the largest effects are concentrated in countries geographically close to China, with Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Russia seeing greater increases in the expected hawkishness of their leaders than, for example, Brazil. However, note that the effects of China's development on the expected hawkishness of U.S. and Australian leaders is greater than it is on the expected hawkishness of Indonesian and Malaysian leaders, despite the fact that the U.S. and Australia are geographically further from China. This is due to the positive, but statistically insignificant, effect of past interstate conflicts between countries on the diffusion of hawkish leaders.

[9] I note here that this was a panel specific shock and that the standard deviation was calculated exclusively based on China's values on the variable *Economic Development*.



Figure 1: The Effect of Reducing Economic Development in China on Leader Hawkishness. Darker shades of red represent increasingly hawkish leaders.

My second set of simulations estimated the expected change in *Leader Hawkishness* in states throughout the world over a four-year period given a one-standard deviation increase in China's level of *Democracy*.[10] Figure 2 reports the results of this simulation, with darker shades of blue representing increasingly dovish leaders. Recall from Table 1 that there is a negative relationship between *Democracy* and *Leader Hawkishness*. Consistent with this, the simulations suggest that increasing the level of democracy in China would result in China having a more dovish leader. As above, the effect of China becoming more democratic also influences the relative hawkishness of the other leaders we observe in the international system. The largest effects again are concentrated in countries geographically close to China, with larger reductions in the expected hawkishness of the leaders of Russian, North Korea, and South Korean than in states located further from China.

[10] As above, this was a panel specific shock based on China's values on *Democracy*.

However, we again see that past MID involvement has a small influence on the relationship between the relative hawkishness of China's leader and the hawkishness of other leaders in the international system This is most clearly seen through the greater effect democratizing China has on the expected hawkishness of U.S. leaders compared to its effects on the expected hawkishness of the leaders of geographically closer states that China has not fought in an interstate conflict.



Figure 2: The Effect of Increasing Democracy in China on Leader Hawkishness. Darker shades of blue represent increasingly dovish leaders.

In sum, the results reported in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 are consistent with my argument that the relative hawkishness and dovishness of political leaders in one state influence the relative hawkishness and dovishness of the political leaders in other states in the international system.

6 Conclusion

There is now something approach a consensus among scholars that political leaders influence patterns of interstate conflict (among others, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Weeks 2012). Arguably the least controversial result in the recent wave of leader-centric research is that hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate conflicts than are dovish leaders (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis 2015, Heffington 2018). The results reported here indicate that whether countries have hawkish or dovish political leaders is not random. Rather, whether a country has a relatively hawkish leader or a relatively dovish leader is driven by a combination of state-level factors and, importantly, the relative hawkishness and dovishness of the leaders of nearby states. This latter result indicates that hawks beget hawks, doves beget doves, and, consequently, hawkish leaders and dovish leaders cluster in space and time.

My findings have a number of important implications for our understanding of interstate conflict processes. At the macro-level, my results offer further evidence that domestic and international politics are inextricably linked. The relative hawkishness of the leaders we observe are influenced not only by domestic factors in their own countries and the relative hawkishness of leaders in geographically proximate countries, but also by domestic factors in these nearby states as they influence the relative hawkishness of their leaders. This implies, for example, the French leaders we observe are a function of domestic factors in France and, due to their influence in determining their respective political leaders, domestic factors in Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, other countries throughout the world. This suggests that an accurate understanding of states' foreign policies and domestic politics requires that we consider both the foreign policies and domestic politics of other states in the international system.[11]

Beyond the general point that domestic and international politics are intertwined, the results reported here have implications for two important areas of research on interstate conflict processes. The first relates to where and when we observe interstate conflict. As noted in the introduction,

[11] This point is similar to Oatley's (2011) argument that answering questions about the domestic political economy (e.g., an individual's trade policy preferences) requires analysts to explicitly consider international processes because states and their economies exist in a complex social system or network.

there is evidence that conflicts diffuse and cluster in time and space (among others, Siverson and Starr 1990, Braithwaite 2005). Given the well-established relationship between hawkish leaders and interstate conflict, my findings suggest that the diffusion and clustering of interstate conflicts likely is driven partially by the diffusion and clustering of hawkish and dovish leaders.

My results also have implications for our understanding of the democratic peace. The most popular explanations for the democratic peace, whether monadic or dyadic, typically focus on how democratic political institutions, broadly conceived, constrain democratic leaders' ability to participate in conflicts to a greater degree than the political institutions constraining non-democratic leaders (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). I find that, all else equal, democracies have less hawkish leaders than do non-democracies. Democracies, then, are less likely to have leaders who need to be constrained from initiating conflicts than are non-democracies. This suggests the democratic peace might be driven less by variation across regime type in the institutions that constrain the behavior of incumbent leaders and more by the institutions that shape who leads democracies and dictatorships in the first place.

This project is very much a work in progress. I plan to make four changes to my current empirical analyses. First, I plan to expand the temporal domain to the period between 1919 and 2003. Second, I plan to add spatial lags for interstate rivals, alliance/alignment patterns, and ongoing territorial disagreements as these factors influence the incentives a state's domestic population has to respond to the relative hawkishness or dovishness of another state's political leader. Third, I plan to estimate specifications that use different operationalizations of a state's security environment and regime type. Fourth, I plan to estimate the link between the diffusion and clustering of hakws and doves to the diffusion and clustering of interstate conflicts. Any additional suggestions for how to improve the paper are very welcome.

References

Achen, Christopher H and Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." *World politics* 41(02):143–169.

Albertson, Bethany and Shana Kushner Gadarian. 2015. *Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World*. Cambridge University Press.

Arena, Philip and Glenn Palmer. 2009. "Is it Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Parliamentary Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(4):955–975.

Ausderan, Jacob. 2015. "Following an Experienced Shepherd: How a Leaders Tenure Affects the Outcome of International Crises." *International Interactions* 41(1):26–45.

Bachman, Jerald G, John David Blair and David R Segal. 1977. *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military*. University of Michigan Press.

Bachman, Jerald G, Peter Freedman-Doan, David R Segal and Patrick M O'Malley. 2000. "Distinctive Military Attitudes among US Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection versus Socialization." *Armed Forces & Society* 26(4):561–585.

Bauerle Danzman, Sarah, W Kindred Winecoff and Thomas Oatley. 2017. "All Crises are Global: Capital Cycles in an Imbalanced International Political Economy." *International Studies Quarterly* 61(4):907–923.
URL: *http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx054*

Berrebi, Claude and Esteban F Klor. 2008. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 102(03):279–301.

Braithwaite, Alex. 2005. "Location, Location, Location Identifying Hot Spots of International Conflict." *International Interactions* 31(3):251–273.

Braithwaite, Alex. 2006. "The Geographic Spread of Militarized Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(5):507–522.

Brambor, Thomas, Johannes Lindvall and Annika Stjernquist. 2017. "The Ideology of Heads of Government, 18702012. Version 1.5." .

Budge, Ian, Hans Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences, Estimates for Parties, Governments and Electors 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Buhaug, Halvard and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2008. "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(2):215–233.

Carpenter, Bob, Andrew Gelman, Matt Hoffman, Daniel Lee, Ben Goodrich, Michael Betancourt, Michael A Brubaker, Jiqiang Guo, Peter Li and Allen Riddell. 2016. "Stan: A probabilistic programming language." *J Stat Softw* .

Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data." *Political Analysis* 18(3):271–292.

Carter, Jeff. 2018. "Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Hawks, Doves, and Interstate Target." Working Paper. The University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS.

Carter, Jeff and Charles E. Smith. 2018. "A Framework for Measuring Leaders' Willingness to Use Force." Working Paper. The University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS.

Carter, Jeff and Giacomo Chiozza. 2018. State Leaders and Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Cameron Thies. Oxford University Press.

Carter, Jeff and Timothy Nordstrom. 2017. "Term Limits, Leader Preferences, and Interstate Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 61(3):721–735.

Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V Milner and Xun Pang. 2015. "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations." *International Organization* 69(2):275–309.

Chiozza, Giacomo and H.E. Goemans. 2011. *Leaders and International Conflict.* Cambridge University Press.

Clare, Joe. 2010. "Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behavior of Parliamentary Democracies." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4):965–987.

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98(02):355–370.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict." *World Politics* 65(04):656–690.

Colgan, Jeff D and Jessica LP Weeks. 2015. "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict." *International Organization* 69(01):163–194.

Correlates of War. 2001. *National Material Capababilities (v.3.02).*

Croco, Sarah E. 2011. "The Deciders Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment." *American Political Science Review* 105(3):457–477.

Debs, Alexandre and H.E. Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders and War." *American Political Science Review* 104(3):430–445.

Elkins, Zachary and Beth Simmons. 2005. "On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 598(1):33–51.

Ellis, Cali Mortenson, Michael C Horowitz and Allan C Stam. 2015. "Introducing the LEAD Data Set." *International Interactions* 41(4):718–741.

Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. "Respect for Human Rights has Improved over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 108(02):297–318.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3):379–414.

Fearon, James D and David D Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(01):75–90.

Foster, Dennis M and Jonathan W Keller. 2014. "Leaders' Cognitive Complexity, Distrust, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10(3):205–223.

Franzese, Robert J and Jude C Hays. 2008. "Interdependence in Comparative Politics: Substance, Theory, Empirics, Substance." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4-5):742–780.

Fuhrmann, Matthew and Michael C Horowitz. 2014. "When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation." *The Journal of Politics* 77(1):72–87.

Gadarian, Shana Kushner. 2010*a*. "Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose Candidates." *The Journal of Politics* 72(04):1046–1062.

Gadarian, Shana Kushner. 2010*b*. "The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 72(02):469–483.

George, Alexander L. 1969. "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly* 13(2):190–222.

Getmansky, Anna and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2014. "Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections." *American Political Science Review* 108(03):588–604.

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(3):133–154.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(3):293–309.

Green, Donald P, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler. 2004. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters.* Yale University Press.

Hays, Jude C, Aya Kachi and Robert J Franzese. 2010. "A Spatial Model Incorporating Dynamic, Endogenous Network Interdependence: A Political Science Application." *Statistical Methodology* 7(3):406–428.

Heffington, Colton. 2018. "Do Hawks and Doves Deliver? The Words and Deeds of Foreign Policy in Democracies." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14(1):64–85.

Hensel, Paul R. 2001. "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(1):81–109.

Hermann, Margaret G. 1980. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* 24(1):7–46.

Hermann, Margaret G. 1987. "Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders, Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, Ohio State University.".

Hermann, Margaret G. 2005. Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis. In *The psychological assessment of political leaders*, ed. Jerrold M. Post. The University of Michigan Press An Arbor, MI pp. 178–212.

Hermann, Margaret G, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany and Timothy M Shaw. 2001. "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals." *International Studies Review* 3(2):83–131.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2012. *Penn World Table Version 7.1.* Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Holman, Mirya R, Jennifer L Merolla and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2011. "Sex, stereotypes, and security: A study of the effects of terrorist threat on assessments of female leadership." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 32(3):173–192.

Horowitz, Michael C, Allan C Stam and Cali M Ellis. 2015. *Why Leaders Fight.* Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Michael C. and Allan C. Stam. 2014. "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders." *International Organization* 68:527–559.

Houghton, David. 2017. Political Psychology of Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy*, ed. Cameron Thies. Oxford University Press. DOI:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.466.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman and Christopher Weber. 2007. "The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 614(1):131–153.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman and Erin Cassese. 2009. "Terrorism, Anxiety, and War". In *Terrorism and Torture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, ed. D. Denemark F. Morgan W. Stritzke, S. Lewandowsky and J. Clare. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 290–312.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Anti-Terrorism Policies." *American journal of political science* 49(3):593–608.

Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations." *Foreign policy analysis* 1(1):1–30.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Belknap Press.

Huth, Paul. 1996. *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. University of Michigan Press.

Huth, Paul K. 1999. "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1):25–48.

Kaarbo, Juliet and Margaret G Hermann. 1998. "Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How Individual Differences affect the Foreign Policymaking Process." *The Leadership Quarterly* 9(3):243–263.

Karch, Andrew. 2007. "Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy Diffusion Research." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 7(1):54–80.

Keller, Jonathan W. 2005. "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2):205–232.

Keller, Jonathan W and Dennis M Foster. 2012. "Presidential Leadership Style and the Political Use of Force." *Political Psychology* 33(5):581–598.

Kertzer, Joshua D. 2016. *Resolve in International Politics.* Princeton University Press.

Koch, Michael T and Patricia Sullivan. 2010. "Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions." *The Journal of Politics* 72(03):616–629.

Kowert, Paul A and Margaret G Hermann. 1997. "Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(5):611–637.

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers. 2005. "Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual." www.cidcm.umd.edu//polity.

Martin, Andrew D and Kevin M Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999." *Political Analysis* 10(2):134–153.

Maves, Jessica and Alex Braithwaite. 2013. "Autocratic Institutions and Civil Conflict Contagion." *The Journal of Politics* 75(2):478–490.

Merolla, Jennifer L and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public.* University of Chicago Press.

Miller, Steven V. 2017. "Individual-level Expectations of Executive Authority under Territorial Threat." *Conflict management and peace science* 34(5):526–545.

Muthoo, Abhinay. 1999. *Bargaining Theory with Applications.* Cambridge University Press.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. "The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy." *International Organization* 65(2):311–341.

Ondercin, Heather L. 2017. "Who Is Responsible for the Gender Gap? The Dynamics of Mens and Womens Democratic Macropartisanship, 1950–2012." *Political Research Quarterly* 70(4):749–761.

Palmer, Glenn, Tamar R. London and Patrick M. Regan. 2004. "What's Stopping You? The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies." *International Interactions* 30(1):1–24.

Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen A Meserve and James Melton. 2010. "Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type." *Political Analysis* pp. 426–449.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American journal of political science* pp. 825–850.

Poole, Keith T and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 228–278.

Reed, William, David H Clark, Timothy Nordstrom and Wonjae Hwang. 2008. "War, Power, and Bargaining." *The Journal of Politics* 70(04):1203–1216.

Renshon, Jonathan. 2008. "Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush from Governor to Second-Term President." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(6):820–849.

Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations.* New York: Norton.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Whelon Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intra-state, and Non-state Wars, 1816-2007.* CQ Press.

Schafer, Mark and Gary Smith. 2017. Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision Making. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, ed. William R. Thompson. Oxford University Press. `http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-393`.

Schafer, Mark and Stephen G Walker. 2006. "Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3):561–583.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. "Hawks and Doves: Estimating Military Policy Positions from Election Platforms.".

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59(01):1–38.

Sechser, Todd S. 2004. "Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(5):746–774.

Seki, Katsunori and Laron K Williams. 2014. "Updating the Party Government data set." *Electoral Studies* 34:270–279.

Senese, Paul D and John A Vasquez. 2005. "Assessing the Steps to War." *British Journal of Political Science* 35(04):607–633.

Shipan, Charles R and Craig Volden. 2008. "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion." *American journal of political science* 52(4):840–857.

Simmons, Beth A, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett. 2006. "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism." *International organization* 60(4):781–810.

Singer, J. David, Stuart A. Bremer and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965". In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage pp. 19–48.

Siverson, Randolph M and Harvey Starr. 1990. "Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War." *American Political Science Review* 84(1):47–67.

Strang, David. 1991. "Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models: An Event History Framework." *Sociological Methods & Research* 19(3):324–353.

Thies, Cameron G, Olga Chyzh and Mark David Nieman. 2016. "The Spatial Dimensions of State Fiscal Capacity The Mechanisms of International Influence on Domestic Extractive Efforts." *Political Science Research and Methods* 4(1):5–26.

Thompson, William and David Dreyer. 2011. *The Handbook of Interstate Rivalries, 1494-2010.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Treier, Shawn and Simon Jackman. 2008. "Democracy as a Latent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1):201–217.

Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The War Puzzle.* Cambridge University Press.

Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, Annika Werner, Onawa Promise Lacewell and Henrike Schultze. 2013. "Comparative Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR).".

Walker, Stephen G. 1983. "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-analysis of the Operational Code Construct." *International Studies Quarterly* 27(2):179–202.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106(2):326–347.

Weeks, Jessica LP. 2014. *Dictators at War and Peace.* Cornell University Press.

Wolford, Scott. 2007. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4):772–788.